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Abstract
A working group was set up to define the LHC safety alarm system, also known as Alarm-of-
Level-3-System (AL3S). The mandate asked for recommendations to be elaborated on four
items: the overall concept of the AL3S for machine and experiments, the transmission and
display of safety alarms, the AL3S during civil engineering construction, and the transition
from the present LEP to the final LHC safety alarm system. The members of the working
group represented a wide range of interest and experience including the CERN Fire Brigade,
safety officers from experiments and machines, and specialists for safety and control systems.
The recommendations highlight the need for a clear definition of responsibilities and
procedures, well-engineered homogeneous systems across CERN, and they point to several
important issues outside the mandate of the working group. These recommendations were
presented, discussed and accepted by several CERN and LHC committees.
21 INTRODUCTION
Obliged to build and to operate the LHC as an Installation Nucléaire de Base (INB), a
working group LHC Alarms-of-Level-3-System (WG-AL3S) was initiated by the INB liaison
officer and the LHC project leader in January 1998. This working group had as its mandate
four chapters relating to Safety Alarms, a more general term of Alarms-of-Level-3, as defined
in the TIS Safety Instruction SI 37:
− the overall concept of the Alarm-of-Level-3-System for the LHC machine and
experiments
− the redundant transmission and the visual display of Alarms-of-Level-3
− the alarm system during the civil engineering construction phase
− the transition from the present LEP to the final LHC safety alarm system.
The membership in the WG-AL3S was discussed with the Technical Coordinators and
the Division and Group Leaders of all the experiments and divisions concerned by these
safety issues. Thus, very competent and committed members with a large variety of
experience formed this working group, including representatives from TIS and CERN's Fire
Brigade, experimental and divisional Safety officers (GLIMOS, DSO), control system
specialists, as well as legal advisors.
The WG-AL3S took into account the experience gained with safety systems, both inside
and outside CERN. In particular, LEP experience was thoroughly analyzed, and visits were
made to the Geneva and Paris airports and to Eurotunnel. Many international and national
Standards were also carefully considered.
Three distinct recommendations for the safety alarm systems for LHC have been
formulated by the working group: those concerning the civil engineering work sites, the
transition from LEP to LHC and finally, the main document treating the overall concept and
redundant transmission. All items of these recommendations will be briefly presented here;
and a few selected ones will be discussed in some detail.
2 THE SAFETY ALARM SYSTEM FOR THE CIVIL ENGINEERING WORK
SITES
When elaborating the recommendations for the safety alarm system for the civil
engineering work sites, the WG-AL3S had to consider that the responsibility for safety on
these work sites lies with the contractors, but that CERN's Fire Brigade is to be called for
emergency and rescue interventions. The standard Red Telephone is installed all over CERN's
premises and offers an adequate means for emergency calls. Every Red Telephone establishes
two diversely redundant transmission paths to the Safety Control Room (SCR) of the Fire
Brigade. One uses the normal telephone exchange system and connects directly to dedicated
telephone sets in the SCR. The location of the Red Telephone emitting the emergency call is
indicated on these sets, permitting the Fire Brigade to localize the caller, even if the latter is
not able to do so himself. Every emergency call is recorded in the SCR for further analysis, if
required. For the second transmission path, the existing Alarm-of-Level-3 system is used. This
system transmits an Alarm-of-Level-3 to the SCR, indication on a synoptic display panel the
safety zone where the call is originating, and showing its detailed location on a video screen
display. All instances of Alarms-of-Level-3 are recorded in a database and are available for
later retrieval and analysis.
3The WG-AL3S recommended the installation of Red Telephones on every civil
engineering work site. CERN management has accepted this and put ST/CE in charge of
implementing the recommendations. The details of number, location, connection points,
period of availability, testing etc are to be agreed by the contractor, CERN's Fire Brigade,
ST/CE, and ST/MC. These recommendations are valid during the civil engineering
construction periods, probably through the years 1998 to 2003.
3 TRANSITION FROM THE LEP TO THE LHC SAFETY ALARM SYSTEM
The dismantling of LEP and the installation of LHC in the surface buildings and the
underground caverns and tunnels represents a complex combination of parallel and
successive works spread over time and in space. We will see a very dynamic evolution of
safety zones, with changing risks and consequently with changing requirements for safety
alarm systems. It would be pretentious to want to define several years in advance detailed
recommendations for safety systems during this transition phase, for risk situations, which
can not be evaluated with sufficient accuracy at present.
The WG-AL3S therefore, recommends that the people in charge of LEP transformation
and of LHC installation be designated responsible for all related safety issues. These people,
the Project and Group Leaders for the machine and the Technical Coordinators for the
Experiments, shall be assisted by the Safety Officers of the divisions and the experiments
concerned, and TIS shall advice.
Together, they shall ensure that risks are properly evaluated for every area and that
minimum requirements for safety systems and alarm transmission are defined. The
implementation of these requirements is then the task of ST/MC, which has to make all the
provisions and to take all the necessary actions throughout the transition period. The need
may occur for the installation of provisional safety alarm systems and alarm transmission for
specific areas and for limited periods. It is expected that the transition period will start in
2000 and end in 2001.
4 THE LHC SAFETY ALARM SYSTEM
4.1 Experiences with Safety Alarm Systems
The WG-AL3S examined the present installations of safety alarm systems, related
emergency procedures and experiences of the users. The experience over the past decade with
the LEP machine and experiment provided essential input for specific user requirements.
Very valid insight was also gained through the visits made to the Geneva and Paris airports
and to Eurotunnel. Furthermore, a thorough search for relevant standards revealed a large
amount of codified experience, which had not been sufficiently exploited at CERN for past
installations of safety alarm systems and associated procedures. The essential elements of the
recommendations of the AL3S working group are derived from the analysis of the user
experiences with present installations and from relevant standards.
4.2 Responsibilities
Experience with LEP has clearly revealed shortcomings due to fragmentation of
responsibilities. In the extreme case, there have been up to five different divisions involved in
the design, installation and maintenance of safety alarm systems in one single experimental
4cavern. All kind of shortcomings resulted from this: from waste of resources due to
duplication in work, over non-homogeneous technical solutions, reduced performance to
multiple technical and human interfacing. One of the major recommendations of the WG-
AL3S addresses this point, stipulating that the responsibility for the entire LHC safety alarm
system for machine and experiments should be with one unique service, and that adequate
resources should be made available to this service for the required high quality of work.
CERN management has very rapidly implemented this recommendation by giving the
responsibility for implementation to the ST/MC group, to be done in close collaboration with
TIS and the safety officers and group leaders in the divisions and experiments concerned.
4.3 Homogeneity and Global Approach
CERN's Fire Brigade, the main actor in case of emergencies, needs to be informed of
safety alarms in exactly the same manner, from wherever these alarms originate and by
whatever techniques they are detected and transmitted. It is, therefore, recommended that a
unique and homogeneous concept of safety alarm systems, transmissions and displays be
introduced for all CERN premises, accelerators and experiments. This means that the safety
alarm systems, which will be introduced for the LHC machines and experiments, shall also be
applied progressively to all other installations at CERN.
The WG-AL3S also recommends that during the process of design and implementation
the safety-case shall be considered globally. This means in particular that the operational and
maintenance interdependencies of the safety alarm system with other important systems, such
as the controlled access, the radiation safety, or accelerator and experiment controls shall be
thoroughly evaluated.
4.4 Engineering Methods and Technology
Two points of the recommendations address engineering methods and new technology.
Rigorous modern and methodical engineering practices should be applied throughout the life
cycle of the project. In particular, for domains such as project management, acceptance
testing, documentation and training, improvements with respect to past practices are most
desirable. Concerning the choice of technologies, the WG-AL3S recommends the use of state-
of-the-art digital technology for the transmission of safety alarms. This implies for example
that a computer system, conceived for the safety case, or multiplex telephone technology are
acceptable, and implicitly, that hard-wired transmission is not. It is also important that if new
technology is chosen, the installation of pilot systems and very thorough field-testing are
required. It is conceivable to use one of the Meyrin site safety zones, which needs adaptation,
as a pilot installation before large-scale implementation for the LHC machine is started. The
present trend to integrate proven industrial equipment, rather than developing CERN specific
equipment, should be enhanced.
4.5 Standards
There exist a large number of international and national standards related to safety
alarm systems and to safety alarm transmission systems. Recently also several standards
dealing with the use of computers for safety related systems have been emerging. It is
surprising to what extend CERN has in the past neglected to make good use of such
5standards, which in fact represent a codified rich experience in the field. The WG-AL3S has




Presently, the CERN premises, accelerators and experiments are divided into Safety-
Zones. There are a total of 36 of these zones and all of them have a Local-Alarm-Display,
indicating the type and the location of safety alarms. This concept shall continue and every
Local-Alarm-Display shall be situated within the Safety-Zone concerned.
5.2 Redundancy
One of the most important elements of the technical recommendations is the request for
two completely independent and diversely redundant, dedicated alarm transmission systems.
The meaning of "diversely redundant" is that different technologies shall be used for the two
systems. Both systems shall be designed and installed such that the risks of common mode
failures are reduced to the minimum. In addition, both systems shall be permanently and
automatically supervised for correct functioning. The Interface diagram of figure 1 shows the
overall context of the two systems, their relation to each other and to other systems and the
peripherals.






























6Both systems, the Safety-Alarm-Transmission system (SAT) and the Safety-and-
Technical-Data system (STD), carry sufficiently detailed information on the type and location
of the safety alarms that the Fire Brigade can decide on the action to be taken even if one of
them is not available.
5.3 Safety-Alarm-Transmission (SAT)
The SAT only transmits safety alarms and technical alarms related to the detection and
transmission of these alarms, with the exclusion of any other alarm or information not related
to safety. The information is primarily intended for the Fire Brigade (FB), i.e. CERN's alarm-
receiving center responsible for emergency and rescue actions. The Technical Control Room
(TCR) has a double back-up function with respect to safety alarms: firstly to be usable by the
FB in case their Safety Control Center (SCR) should not be available, and secondly to
accompany the FB's safety actions with possible technical actions. Therefore, all SAT
information shall be displayed identically and redundantly in the SCR and in the TCR.
For the alarm detection, transmission and display, industrial products approved for the
safety-case shall be used. The request for detailed information on the type and location of
every safety alarm to be displayed, excludes for the LHC the use of the present CERN
technology, i.e. electro-mechanical relay systems and hardwired cabling. Instead, an
industrial fieldbus as implemented at the two visited airports, or a multiplex system as used
for telephone communications can be considered. A detailed evaluation of these and other
possible technical solutions is required, including thorough field-testing and pilot
installations.
In many situations, safety alarms need to trigger safety actions automatically, like for
example a gas leak needs to have the gas supply cut very rapidly in order to prevent the risk
of explosion. For these kinds of automatic actions, the equipment most suitable and closest to
the detector shall communicate directly with the appropriate actuator. Here, the distances
being short, the communication may be via local fieldbus, or via hardwired contacts. A
specific request from the experimental physicists is that the alarm detection equipment in
experimental zones shall be capable of providing hardwired signals for use by the
experiments.
5.4 Safety and Technical Data System (STD)
The STD transmits all detailed information on safety alarms as well as all detailed
technical alarms, equipment states and data for the entire technical infrastructure of CERN.
This technical infrastructure may include systems such as electric distribution, cooling,
ventilation, air conditioning, cryogenics, vacuum, and naturally all safety systems. This
system is primarily intended for the TCR, but also for the SCR and other users, such as
accelerator control rooms or the equipment specialists. At LEP, the control system for the
technical infrastructure is common with that of the accelerator. This causes many operational
shortcomings and problems. The basic requirements for the control of classical technical
systems are also different from those for accelerators. Technical systems require a very high
degree of reliability, transmission time is not a major concern, whereas accelerators need to
transfer large amounts of data with high speed. Therefore, the working group has
7recommended that for LHC the STD shall be independent from the control systems used for
the accelerator and the experiments.
5.5 Data Exchange with Other Control Systems
In LEP a major operational shortcoming is that data exchange between different control
systems was not designed from the outset and could never be satisfactorily implemented
afterwards. There are many technical, accelerator and experimental slow control systems or
subsystems whose correct or optimal operation depends on other systems. It is, for example,
important for an experiment to have information on cooling conditions as supplied by the
cooling water or the air conditioning system. Following one of the recommendations of the
working group, the CERN Control Board has set up a working group to define a common
data exchange mechanism between all LHC control systems. The STD shall be designed so
that it is capable of implementing the forthcoming data exchange protocols. It appears that the
Technical Data Server (TDS) implemented by the TCR in recent years has already the basic
essential features for data distribution to subscribers. This TDS concept and probably even its
present implementation are considered a good elements for the STD and data exchanges with
other systems.
5.6 Reference Database and Data Logging
For the present technical installations at CERN, there are control systems that have no
systematic description of their process, equipment or control parameters in a database.
Operation and in particular maintenance of such systems is difficult, inefficient and full of
errors. Well-designed, systematic, consistent and complete reference databases are a must for
efficient control systems. It is recommended to have one common reference data base for
both alarm transmission systems, the SAT and the STD.
An essential requirement from control room operators, but even more from equipment
specialists is to be able to make historical analysis of system behavior and of special events.
Data logging is common practice for computerized control systems nowadays and a common
data logging system shall be implemented for SAT and STD. This data logging system shall
allow efficient logging, retrieval, treatment and display or export of all data transmitted via
SAT and STD.
These two recommendations are a challenge for the design engineers, as this requires
additional interfaces between SAT and STD that are to be independent and redundant
systems.
5.7 False Alarms
False alarms represent major problems for the SCR (Fire Brigade) and TCR operators.
The WG-AL3S recommends serious efforts to be made during all stages of specification,
design, implementation, testing and maintenance to avoid false alarms of any level. This
request clearly concerns sensors, detectors and alarm systems, but also all process systems
and equipment, as false alarms will hide real alarms and will lead to inappropriate actions by
the operators. The matter of false alarms being very badly handled in present technical
installations at CERN and needing to be substantially improved, the contribution by M. Batz
is dedicated specifically to this subject [1].
86 ADDITIONAL WORKING GROUPS
During it's half year of animated discussions, the WG-AL3S came across subjects which
have close relations with the LHC Safety Alarm System, but are somewhat outside its
mandate. The working group, therefore, formulates several recommendations for the attention
of the CERN management, which all require, in one form or another, additional working
groups to be set up.
6.1 Risk Analyses and Alarm Systems
Technical working groups should be set up to analyze risks, and to define sensors,
detectors, installations and actions best suited to the expected risks. All LHC experiments and
the LHC tunnel itself contain various installations representing specific risks. About five such
working groups, each with the Safety Officers and other competent people, possibly also with
outside experts, will be needed. The ST Division, in particular its Alarm and Access Group
will have to participate in all of them, and it will have to play a leading role on those matters
where it has expert competence.
6.2 Procedures, Documentation and Training for Emergency Situations
At present, we find situations at LEP whereby the respective responsibility and actions
in case of emergency interventions are not defined, not clear or not properly implemented.
Another major shortcoming concerning emergency situations are the poor state of required
documentation, which is either not existing, of poor quality, or not up-to-date. CERN
management should ensure that the procedures for safety and rescue interventions are
consistent, correctly documented, properly implemented and that regular targeted training is
provided for all people involved.
6.3 Data Exchange
The importance of data exchange between all control systems of the LHC machine and
its experiments has been stressed above and a working group, setup by the CERN Controls
Board, is already active.
6.4 TIS Safety Instruction SI 37 Alarms and Alarm Systems
This Safety Instruction SI 37, Alarms and Alarm Systems, needs to be reviewed. In
particular, it contains some statements that are not in accordance with international standards.
It also gives instructions, for instance, for hard-wired alarm transmission with which the WG-
AL3S, after very careful considerations, does not agree for the LHC machine. SI 37 is
furthermore very unbalanced, concentrating mainly on procedures for temporary
unavailability of alarm systems. It is also clear that these procedures, relying on paper forms,
can not work and that an electronic system is needed, in particular to get the required
signatures in time and to provide the correct information on the maintenance state of safety
alarm systems in real time to everybody involved.
96.5 Implementation of the WG-AL3S Recommendations
The last recommendation of the WG-AL3S expresses the need for a kind of supervisory
body that should ensure that the recommendations are properly and fully implemented. As the
recommendations have been formulated intentionally in general terms, leaving much freedom
to those responsible for the definition, design and implementation of the alarm systems, it is
probable that interpretations will need arbitration. The supervisory body should have a major
role to play in this respect. CERN management has meanwhile decided that the TIS Division
Leader should be chairman of this supervisory body, and that two other competent and high-
ranked technical people should assist him.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Following a suggestion made by the INB liaison officer and a mandate given by the
LHC Project Leader, the working group WG-AL3S elaborated and formulated
recommendations for safety alarm systems for the LHC, to be implemented progressively for
all CERN premises and installations. These recommendations have been presented and
widely discussed by several safety, machine and experimental coordination and technical
committees. They have been endorsed by these committees and by the CERN management
and are a good basis for homogeneous alarm systems for the LHC machine and its
experiments. CERN management has entrusted the ST Division, in particular the two groups
AA (Alarms & Access) and MO (Monitoring & Operation), a heritage of the late group
ST/MC (Monitoring & Communication), with the technical implementation of these
recommendations.
Through the attribution of this challenging task to one single service unit, CERN
management clearly expresses its wish to obtain in the most effective way a homogeneous
and reliable safety alarm system. It is now up to us, the AA and MO groups of our ST
Division, to establish or to enhance existing collaborations throughout CERN, a vital
prerequisite for the demanding tasks ahead, and set very rapidly to work. It is likely that we
will require some additional highly qualified manpower in order to be able to cope with the
multitude of tasks requiring innovative management, systematic quality approaches and high
technical competence.
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